Overview of Battle
(Drawings will be added at a later date)
(Topical anchors will be added at a later date)
Sunday, July 21, dawned bright and clear. The listless stirring of the trees gave early promise that the day would be hot. Dust lay thick upon the grass, the brush, and the uniforms of the men. The Confederate camps were just beginning to stir from a restless night when, suddenly about 5:15 a. m., there was heard the thunderous roar of a big gun in the vicinity of the Stone Bridge. With this shot, fired from a 30-pounder Parrott rifle of Tyler's command, McDowell opened the first battle of the war.
Since 2:30 a. m. his troops had been in motion executing a well conceived plan of attack. In bright moonlight, across the valley from Centreville "sparkling with the frost of steel," the Federal army had moved in a three-pronged attack. McDowell had originally planned to turn the Confederate right, but the affair of the 18th at Blackburn's Ford had shown the Confederates in considerable strength in that sector. Further informed that the Stone Bridge was mined and that the turnpike west of the bridge was blocked by a heavy abatis, he determined to tum the extreme Confederate left. By this flanking movement he hoped to seize the Stone Bridge and destroy the Manassas Gap Railroad at or near Gainesville, thus breaking the line of communication between Johnston, supposedly at Winchester, and Beauregard at Manassas. To screen the main attack, Tyler was to make a feinting thrust at the Confederate defenses at the Stone Bridge, while Richardson was to make a diversion at Blackburn's Ford. Miles' division was to cover Centreville, while Runyon's division covered the road to Washington. To a large extent the success of the attack depended upon two factors--rapidity of movement and the element of surprise.
Turning to the right at Cub Run Bridge, the main Federal column, composed of Hunter's and Heintzelman's divisions, had followed a narrow dirt road to Sudley Ford which they reached, after exasperating delays, about 9:30 a. m. Here the men stopped to drink and fill their canteens. Though this loss of time was costly, success might still have been theirs if the movement had not been detected.
From Signal Hill, a high observation point within the Manassas defenses, the Confederate signal officer, E. P. Alexander, had been scanning the horizon for any evidence of a flanking movement. With glass in hand he was examining the area in the vicinity of Sudley Ford when about 8:45 a. m. his attention was arrested by the glint of the morning sun on a brass field piece. Closer observation revealed the glitter of bayonets and musket barrels. Quickly he signaled Evans at the Stone Bridge, "Look out for your left; you are turned." This message, which was to play an important part in the tactical development of the battle, represents probably the first use under combat conditions of the "wigwag" system of signaling.
MORNING PHASE--THE FIGHT AT MATTHEWS HILL. Since 8 o'clock it had been apparent to Evans that Tyler's attack was simply a feint. Now warned of the approach of the flanking column, he moved rapidly to counter it. Leaving four companies of his command to guard the bridge with two pieces of artillery, he pushed northwestward about 1,700 yards to a point near the crossing of the Warrenton Turnpike and the Manassas-Sudley Road. There, about 10:15 a. m., he opened with artillery and infantry fire upon the advancing Federal column led by Burnside's brigade. Soon Col. Andrew Porter moved to Burnside's assistance. Hard-pressed after a gallant stand of about an hour, Evans sent an urgent request to Bee for help. Temporarily attached to Bee's brigade was Bartow with two Georgia regiments. With his command Bee had previously taken up a position on Henry Hill from which point Imboden's battery had played with telling effect upon the flanking column of McDowell.
Bee moved promptly forward, taking up a position on the right of Evan's line about 11 a.m. Here the combined Confederate force of approximately five regiments with six field pieces held stubbornly until about noon. The arrival of fresh Federal reinforcements of Heintzelman, and later of Sherman and Keyes, so increased the pressure on the Confederate right that its defenses gave way. Eagerly the Federal columns pushed their advantage as the now demoralized Confederates retreated across Young's Branch to the shelter of the Robinson House Hill. Following closely, keyes moved downstream and took up a position in the shelter of the hills where he remained to take little effective part in further fighting during the day.
In a position near the Robinson House, Hampton's legion, 600 strong, courageously attempted to cover the Confederate retreat. The Federal attack, however, finally forced them back with the disordered commands of Bee, Bartow, and Evans.
In the midst of the wild confusion that then ensued, as the fate of the battle hung in the balance, there occurred one of the dramatic moments of the war. Bee, desperately attempting to rally his men, glanced toward Henry Hill where he saw Jackson and his command standing bold and resolute. Catching the inspiration of the moment, Bee leaned forward in his stirrups and with pointed sword shouted to his men, "Look! There is Jackson standing like a stone wall! Rally behind the Virginians!" Thus "Stonewall" Jackson won his famous sobriquet.
It was about this time that Johnston and Beauregard galloped upon the field. In the presence of their commanding officers the men gained new confidence. The line stiffened, formed again, and advanced to the front. Reinforcements from Cocke's and Bonham's brigades, at fords farther down Bull Run, were now fast coming up. Quickly upon their arrival they were sent into position to the right and left of Jackson. Johnston soon retired to the Lewis House ("Portici"), where he directed the movement of reinforcements from the rear, while Beauregard took immediate command of the field.
There now occurred a lull between 1 and 2 p. m. as the victorious Federal troops crossed the valley of Young's Branch and reformed for a renewal of the attack.
AFTERNOON PHASE. About 2 p. m., McDowell ordered forward the two splendid, regular batteries of Ricketts and Griffin, directing them to take up an exposed position just South of the Henry House. At a distance of not much more than 300 yards, these batteries were soon engaged in a furious duel with the artillery arrayed in Jackson's front. For about 15 minutes the din was terrific. Finally, in an effort to gain a better enfilading fire, Griffin advanced three of his guns slightly. The movement proved fatal.
At this moment J. E. B. Stuart made a dashing cavalry charge up the Manassas-Sudley Road, scattering the colorful Fire Zouaves who had been advanced to the support of Ricketts and Griffin. Almost simultaneously the 33rd Virginia regiment moved forward. Mistaken by one of the Federal officers as a battery support, it was allowed to come within 70 yards of Griffin's guns. Suddenly the regiment delivered a murderous volley, which killed most of the horses and men of both batteries. The immobilized guns were seized by the Virginians, only to be recaptured by a spirited Federal advance. In heated charges and countercharges the guns changed hands a number of times, yet neither side was able to employ them effectively. Their loss to the Federal command was irreparable.
Fcderal pressure now became so strong that Beauregard decided to attack. As Jackson penetrated the center of the Federal line, the Confederate right swept clear the area in the vicinity of the Robinson House. In a gallant countercharge, however, the Union brigades of Franklin, Willcox, Sherman, and Porter surged forward to reclaim the lost ground. In the attack, McDowell displayed reckless courage by climbing to the upper story of the Henry House to obtain a better view of the whole field.
The battle now raged with increasing severity as both sides fought desperately for possession of the plateau--"the key to victory." The weight of Federal pressure upon Beauregard's left and right flanks so increased as to endanger his whole posidon. It was now about 3 p. m. The scorching rays of the sun beat unmercifully upon the exhausted troops as Beauregard, at this critical stage, ordered yet another general attack all along the line. Just then Fisher's 6th North Carolina regiment arrived to take position on the Confederate left. With Beauregard leading the charge, the Confederate line advanced to clear the field and regain final possession of the Henry and Robinson Houses.
Despite the loss of the plateau, McDowell's position was still strong. With his right anchored in the woods in the vicinity of the Chinn House, his line stretched in a great crescent back of the Stone House to a position near the Stone Bridge. However, the right held by Howard's brigade and Sykes' regulars had become so extended as to face almost east towards Centreville. Thus extended, it invited an attack which the Confederate command was quick to mount. Reinforcements, sent forward by Johnston, now rapidly moved up. In the lead were Kershaw's 2d and Cash's 8th South Carolina regiments followed by Kemper's battery. Quickly following these troops came Elzey's brigade, 1,700 strong. This brigade of Johnston's Army, detrained only a few hours before, had advanced to the sound of firing, led by Kirby Smith. To the weight of these numbers was added still another fresh brigade--Early's. Coming into position to the left of Elzey's brigade, Early struck the Federal right in flank and rear.
The combined attack, delivered about 3:45 p. m., proved overwhelming. The Federal line staggered and fell back, retiring across the field in some semblance of order. A brief rally north of Young's Branch was broken up by Confederate artillery fire. All other attempts to rally the men proved futile. They had had enough. Now they continued homeward by the various routes of the morning's advance. Bravely covering the retreat were Sykes' regulars and Palmer's squadron of cavalry.
As the main body of the Federal army retreated in the direction of Sudley Ford, Keyes' brigade recrossed at the Stone Bridge closely pursued by a Confederate detachment led by Kemper's battery. Riding astraddle one of the guns was the venerable "Yankee hater," Edmund Ruffin, who had fired one of the first shots at Fort Sumter. Dusty and weary he had arrived upon the field in the closing moments of the battle in time to hall Kemper's battery as it was passing. Eager to get another shot at the enemy, he held precariously to his seat as the battery went jolting past the Stone Bridge and along the pike now littered with arms, accoutrements, haversacks, knapsacks, loose articles of clothing, blankets, drums, and brass musical instruments left by the rapidly retiring troops.
After proceeding a few miles, Kemper's guns reached an advantageous rise. There they were unlimbered and quickly made ready for firing. The first shot, fired by the elderly Ruffin, hit squarely upon the suspension bridge over Cub Run upsetting a wagon that had just been driven upon it. This served to barricade the bridge to further use by other vehicles. In quick succession more shots were fired. Complete panic now seized the Federal troops as they fled in a wild rout back to Washington. Adding to the confusion were the throngs of sightseers and fugitives who crowded the narrow roads. The roar of the flight, wrote Russell, The London Times correspondent, was like the rush of a great river. All through the night and the rain of the next day the tide of soldiers and civilans streamed into Washington. Attempts by McDowell to rally the soldiers were in vain.
The exhausted, battle-weary Confederates made no effective pursuit. Early's brigade and Stuart's cavalry did succeed in capturing quite a number of prisoners, but the main Union force escaped. July 22 found both armies in the positions they had occupied prior to the 16th.
EFFECTS OF FIRST MANASSAS. The news of the disaster was first received in the Capital with incredulity and amazement, then with consternation. Throughout the night President Lincoln received spectators of the battle and listened in silence to their descriptions of the engagement.
"For a few days," writes Channing, "the North was dazed, stocks went down, money went up, and people sat around with their hands folded in despair. Then, almost as by magic, the scene shifted and stern resolve took the place of the hysteria of the Hundred Days since Sumter. Lincoln called for volunteers. The best blood of the North in all ranks of society, in the East, in the Ohio Valley, and on the shores of the Great Lakes responded. The new men went into the conflict with a determination and a spirit that has seldom been seen and never excelled."
In the South, the news of the victory was received with great elation. Thanksgiving sermons were preached from the pulpits while public officials commemorated the event with congratulatory proclamations. In the ill-considered opinion of many Southerners the war was over, yet seldom if ever has so complete a victory borne such meager results. An overweening confidence and a false sense of security developed in the South a paralysis of enterprise more damaging to it than was the disaster of defeat for the North.
The battle, however, as the English historian Fuller points out, was to have a profound influence on the grand strategy of the war. "First, it imbued the Southern politicians with an exaggerated idea of the prowess of their soldiers and so led them to under-estimate the fighting capacity of their enemy; secondly, it so terrified Lincoln and his Government that from now onwards until 1864, east of the Alleghanies, the defence of Washington became the pivot of Northern strategy."
Though the men of each army had fought with flashes of steadiness and exceptional courage, there was ample evidence to show the costly result of inadequate training.
| FEDERAL | CONFEDERATE | ||||
| Strength, approximate | 35,000 | 32,000 | |||
| Killed | 460 | 387 | |||
| Wounded | 1,124 | 1,582 | |||
| Captured or missing | 1,312 | 13 | |||
| ---------- | ---------- | ||||
| Total | 2,896 | 1,982 | |||
(Text Adapted From: Manassas Historical Handbook Series - publication of the National Park Service. 1961.)