Peachtree Creek
On Privately Owned Land
Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park is administered by the National Park Service of the United States Department of the Interior. The mailing address is 900 Kennesaw Mountain Drive, Kennesaw, GA 30152. Telephone: 770-427-4686.
Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park, documenting the battle for Kennesaw Mountain, is one component of the Atlanta Campaign in the Civil War. The Park is located circa 20 miles north of Atlanta, Georgia (three miles north of Marietta, GA): from Atlanta, take U.S. Highway I-75 north 20 miles to exit 116. Drive approximately one mile northwest on U. S. Highway 41 to intersection with Old U. S. Highway 41. Drive approximately two miles northwest on Old U. S. Highway 41 to intersection with Stilesboro Road. Turn left on Stilesboro Road and drive 1/4 mile west to Park entrance .
Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park, although located on the site of the Kennesaw Mountain battlefield, provides visitors with information about the entire Atlanta Campaign during the Civil War.
The Park grounds are open daily from 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m., extended to 6 p.m. on weekdays during the summer. The Park is closed on Christmas and New Year's Day. The National Park Service maintains a Visitor's Center on the Park grounds, containing exhibits and audiovisual programs.
On the Park grounds is a self-guided driving tour. Interpretive markers and wayside exhibits are situated along the driving trail, each with parking provided. Short interpretive trails are located on the mountaintop, with exhibits and gun emplacements, and stops providing panoramic views of the battlefield terrain. Longer hiking trails also crisscross the Park.
Civil War Sites Advisory Commission Report on Peachtree Creek: GA016
(The CWSAC Battle Summary Will Open In Its Own Window)
Peachtree Creek In The Atlanta Campaign: July 20, 1864
(Topical anchors will be added at a later date)
During the night of July 9-10, Johnston retreated across the river and took up a position on the southern bank of Peachtree Creek only a few miles from Atlanta. The Confederate commander seems to have been optimistic at this time. Once again he believed that he had reached a position from which he could not be driven and he expected to fight the decisive battle of the campaign along Peachtree Creek.
Sherman, meanwhile, had decided upon his next step. He would swing north and east of Atlanta to cut Johnston off from Augusta and possible reinforcements from Virginia. McPherson was to strike eastward from Roswell to the Georgia Railroad at some point near Stone Mountain. As this force advanced, the rest of the Federals would move closer to the river. The line would thus become a great swinging movement, with McPherson on the far left, Schofield in the center as the pivot, and Thomas on the right along Peachtree Creek. This movement began on the 17th. The next day, McPherson reached the Georgia Railroad near Stone Mountain.
PEACHTREE CREEK
John Bell Hood, the new commander of the Confederate forces, found himself in a difficult position on the morning of July 18, 1864. Hood was young--only 33--and relatively inexperienced in handling large bodies of troops. After graduation from West Point (in the same class with the Federal Generals McPherson and Schofield) he had served with the U. S. Army until the spring of 1861, when he resigned and cast his lot with the Confederacy. In the early years of the war Hood had risen rapidly in rank--a rise more than justified by his outstanding leadership at the brigade and division level.Until the summer of 1863, Hood had been physically one of the most magnificent men in the Confederate Army. A woman who knew him in 1861 described him as "six feet two inches in height, with a broad, full chest, light hair and beard, blue eyes, with a peculiarly soft expression, commanding in appearance, dignified in deportment, gentlemanly and courteous to all." By the time he took command of the Army of Tennessee, Hood's appearance had undergone some changes. His left arm dangled uselessly at his side, smashed by a Federal bullet at Gettysburg in July 1863. His right leg was gone, cut away at the hip following a wound received at the Battle of Chickamauga in September 1863. Hood suffered great pain from these wounds, and no doubt he should have been retired from field command; but he was not the kind of man who could stay away from the army during a war.
After recovering from his second wound, he was sent to the Army of Tennessee as a corps commander and had served in that capacity until Davis selected him to succeed Johnston. He may have been taking a derivative of laudanum to ease his pain and some students of the war believe that this affected his judgment. Many soldiers in the army distrusted Hood's ability. Some officers resented his promotion over the heads of generals who had served with the army since the beginning of the war. Hood himself believed that the army had been demoralized by Johnston's long retreat and hence was unlikely to fight well.
Nor could the tactical situation have brought Hood any encouragement. Thomas' Army of the Cumberland was advancing southward directly toward Atlanta, while the armies of McPherson and Schofield were east of the city, advancing westward. Two of the four railroads that connected Atlanta with the rest of the Confederacy were in Federal hands. Unless Hood could keep the remaining lines open, the city was doomed.
On July 19, the Army of the Cumberland crossed Peachtree Creek, but as it advanced, it drifted toward the west. Thus by the afternoon a gap had developed in the Northern line between Thomas on the right and Schofield in the center. Hood decided to concentrate the corps of Hardee and Stewart against Thomas. The Confederate commander hoped to overwhelm the isolated Army of the Cumberland before help could arrive from McPherson and Schofield. Hood relied upon his former corps, temporarily commanded by Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham, and the cavalry to defend the area east of Atlanta. The attack on Thomas was set for 1 p.m., July 20.
Early in the morning of the 20th, while the Southerners were preparing to assail the right of the Federal line, the Northerners east of Atlanta moved west along the Georgia Railroad toward the city. Their progress was so rapid that Hood felt it necessary to shift his army to the right in an effort to strengthen the forces defending the eastern approaches to Atlanta. This movement led to such confusion in the Confederate ranks that the attack against Thomas was delayed for about 3 hours. When the Southerners were finally ready to strike, Thomas' men had had time to establish and partly fortify a position on the south side of Peachtree Creek.
What Hood had planned as a quick blow against an unprepared Northern army thus developed into a headlong assault against a partially fortified line. For several hours the Southerners threw themselves against the Federals. Most of the attacks were halted before they seriously threatened the Union position, but for a short while it appeared that some of Hardee's men would sweep around the left of Thomas' line and win a great victory. Hastily, Thomas assembled artillery batteries and directed their fire against the Southerners. Eventually the Confederates were driven back.
While fighting raged along Peachtree Creek, McPherson continued to push toward Atlanta from the east. By 6 p.m., Hood was forced to call upon Hardee for troops to reinforce the Southern lines east of the city. This order drew from Hardee the reserve division that he was preparing to throw into the assault against Thomas and forced him to abandon the attack. The first of Hood's efforts to cripple the Federal army had failed, although at the time some Southerners saw it as a blow that slowed Federal progress.
Northern casualties in the Battle of Peachtree Creek were reported at 1,600. Estimates of Southern losses (mostly from Federal sources) range from 2,500 to 10,000. It seems now that 4,700 is a reliable estimate of Confederate casualties.
The battle later became a source of controversy between Hood and Hardee. Hood, smarting under the criticism of Joseph E. Johnston and others, blamed the failure to crush Thomas on Hardee. The corps commander, Hood charged, had failed to attack at the proper time and had not driven home the assault. Hardee, who had outranked Hood when they were both lieutenant generals and who may have been disgruntled at serving under his former junior, replied that the delay was caused by Hood's decision to shift the line to the right and that the assault had not been as vigorously executed as it normally would have been because Hood's late-afternoon order to send reinforcements to the right had deprived the attackers of the unit that was to deliver the final blow. Postwar commentators mostly favor Hardee and a careful examination of the evidence supports this view.
(Text Adapted From: Atlanta Campaign Historical Handbook Series - publication of the National Park Service. 1961.)